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The principle of self-determination, along with the principle of respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, belongs to the fundamental principles of international law 
that have the character of peremptory norms. Such norms, as defined in Article 53 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, being jus cogens norms, give rise 
to erga omnes obligations. There is no doubt that both of these principles occupy a very 
important place in the system of modern international law, and particularly in the hier-
archically constructed catalogue of the fundamental principles of this law. It is therefore 
necessary to draw attention to the very clear connection and interdependence between 
these two principles. The doctrine holds that there is a  kind of bilateral dependence 
between the principle of self-determination and human rights law. This means that on 
the one hand the principle of self-determination is essential for the effective guarantee 
of human rights, while on the other hand the guarantee of human rights is ensured by 
the principle of self-determination1. Therefore, such an understanding of the interde-
pendence between the principle of self-determination and human rights entails that in 
practice it is possible to implement the principle of self-determination in a national legal 
system as lex generalis, through application of the norms of international human rights 
law as lex specialis.2
In highlighting these issues, it should be noted that in the norms of international 
law, which include the norms of international human rights law, and in the doctrine of 
international law, two concepts are present: the principle of self-determination and the 
1 U. Barten, Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-Determination, Heidelberg – New York 
– Dordrecht – London 2015, p. 81 et seq.; A. Michalska, Interpretacja Międzynarodowego Paktu 
Praw Cywilnych i Politycznych w świetle raportów Komitetu Praw Człowieka, RPEiS 1986, no. 2, 
pp. 13–14.
2 M. Perkowski, Samostanowienie narodów w prawie międzynarodowym, Warszawa 2001, p. 131.
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right of peoples to self-determination. With this borne in mind, it is necessary to stress 
that the theoretical construct of the right to self-determination is very interesting, since 
on the one hand it is conceived of as a principle of international law, and on the other 
hand it can be seen as a crucial law in the inventory of human rights. The inventory of 
human rights is based on general principles that apply to all the provisions for rights 
and freedoms, and which are essential in both their interpretation and application.3 One 
of these principles is the principle of self-determination, and a  fundamental element 
of this principle, which enables its practical implementation, is the right of peoples to 
self-determination.4
The principle of self-determination was for a  long time regarded as purely politi-
cal and was thus deprived of legal character.5 The political dimension of the principle 
was clearly formulated in President Woodrow Wilson’s Declaration, which in practice 
significantly contributed to the emergence of new states after the First Word War, par-
ticularly in Central Europe.6 Of course, the emergence of these new states did not entail 
that the principle of self-determination was implemented in the sense defined in the 
later provisions of international law, particularly within the United Nations system. The 
principle was absent from the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
which established the mandate system, and which was a kind of compromise between 
the political principle of self-determination and the political and economic interests of 
the colonial powers. It should be borne in mind that in the practice of the League of 
Nations the relevant legal aspects of the principle of self-determination were discussed 
by two committees that were set up to investigate the issue of the Åland Islands. The 
committees recognised the principle of self-determination, but ruled out the possibility 
of secession as a road to implementing self-determination in practice.7 The principle of 
self-determination only finally attained the status of a positive, universal principle of 
international law in the United Nations Charter, two provisions of which merit close at-
tention, namely Article 1 § 2 and Article 55.8 Article 1 outlines the basic purposes of the 
United Nations, and just after defining the organisation’s primary purpose – which is to 
strive for the maintenance of international peace and security – § 1 states that the aim of 
3 A. Michalska, Prawa człowieka w systemie norm międzynarodowych, Warszawa – Poznań 1982, 
p. 67.
4 For an often cited commentary v.: B. Saul, D. Kinley, J. Mowbray, The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Commentary, Cases and Materials, Oxford 2014, p. 12 et seq.
5 L. Dembiński, Samostanowienie w prawie i praktyce ONZ, Warszawa 1969, p. 35 et seq.
6 K. Kocot, K. Wolfke, Wybór dokumentów do nauki prawa międzynarodowego, Wrocław – War-
szawa 1978, p. 45.
7 M. Kałduński, Samostanowienie (zasada samostanowienia narodów), in Leksykon ochrony praw 
człowieka, ed. M. Balcerzak, S. Sykuna, Warszawa 2010, p. 442.
8 T. Gadkowski, Narody i inne podmioty uprawnione w ramach prawa do samostanowienia, in Ubi 
ius, ibi remedium. Księga dedykowana pamięci Profesora Jana Kolasy, ed. B.  Krzan, Warszawa 
2016, p. 144 et seq.
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the United Nations is: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appro-
priate measures to strengthen universal peace.” Whereas Article 55 of the Charter, from 
Chapter IX – which is devoted to international economic and social cooperation – states 
that there is a need to create “conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”9 This clear and unambiguous expres-
sion of the principle of self-determination in the provisions of the Charter undoubt-
edly contributed to the strong position the principle holds today. It should be borne in 
mind, however, that in the first years after the adoption of the Charter this principle had 
lex imperfecta character, due to the geopolitical situation, the distinguishing feature of 
which was the continued existence of the colonial system.10 
The international law sources  
of the principle of self-determination
These provisions from the United Nations Charter mark the introduction of the princi-
ple of self-determination into the normative system of international law. The principle 
was further defined and developed in subsequent regulations of international law, in its 
various forms – thus both in treaty regulations and regulations of a soft law character. 
There is no doubt that the principle was originally interpreted to support the process 
of decolonisation, and to this end the most authoritative and purposeful interpretation 
of the Charter provisions cited above can be found in the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted on 14 December 1960, as 
a resolution of the UN General Assembly.11 The provisions of the Declaration can be 
viewed as constituting a broader interpretation of the United Nations Charter provi-
sions, being based on the assumption that: “The subjection of peoples to alien subjuga-
tion, domination and exploitation constitutes a  denial of fundamental human rights, 
is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promo-
tion of world peace and co-operation.” Accordingly, the Declaration goes on to state, 
in § 2, that: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.” When the title of this Declaration is taken into consideration, 
along with the general political context that accompanied its adoption, it is apparent 
9 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Ch. IX, Article 55, 1 UNTS 
XVI.
10 M. Perkowski, op. cit., p. 29
11 UNGA Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples.
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that the principle of self-determination was unambiguously linked to the observance of 
human rights, and the right to self-determination stipulated in the Declaration clearly 
refers to the holders of these rights: peoples from colonized and subjugated territories. 
It is also noteworthy that the clearly formulated principle of self-determination in the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter, and its interpretation in the provisions of 
Resolution 1514 (XV), gave weight to the arguments for including the principle in the 
International Covenant on Human Rights, which was prepared by the Commission on 
Human Rights. Proponents of this inclusion even asserted the primacy of the right to 
self-determination over other human rights, pointing out that in many cases individu-
als are unable to exercise their individual rights effectively, since their society has no 
guaranteed right to self-determination and cannot establish its own state. And yet it is 
precisely states that are able to guarantee the legal and institutional protection of human 
rights and the fundamental freedoms.12 It goes without saying that this position was not 
universally accepted, with critics holding that since the right to self-determination is 
a collective right, and therefore applies to entities of a collective nature, it should not be 
a component of a legal regulation that is based on an individualist conception of human 
rights.13 Ultimately, in Resolution 545 (VI) the General Assembly decided to include the 
right to self-determination in the International Covenant on Human Rights. However, 
subsequent discussion focused on two distinct and opposing conceptions of this right. 
The concept of internal self-determination was based on the assumption that this right 
is the right of peoples organised as states to freely decide on the political, social and 
economic system that their state should adopt. In contrast, the concept of external self-
determination entailed the right of peoples subjugated by colonial powers to gain their 
own statehood.14
In Article 1, section 1 of both Covenants, the following statement can be found: “All 
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”15 
The interpretation of these provisions leads to two important conclusions. Firstly, the 
Covenants presented the universal character of the principle of self-determination and, 
secondly, the provisions clearly associate human rights with the rights of nations, par-
12 L. Antonowicz, Samostanowienie narodów jako zasada prawa międzynarodowego, “Annales 
UMCS” 1996, no. 43, p. 70 et seq.; J. Symonides, Międzynarodowa ochrona praw człowieka, War-
szawa 1977, p. 45.
13 A. Michalska, Komitet Praw Człowieka. Kompetencje, funkcjonowanie, orzecznictwo, Warszawa 
1994, p. 101.
14 UNGA Third Committee, A/3077 and UNGA Res. 2158 (XXI), Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources.
15 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
16 December 1966, United Nations, Part 1, Article 1, UNTS, vol. 993, p. 3.
The Principle of Self-Determination... | 29 
ticularly the right to self-determination.16 For this reason, the Covenants should be seen 
as having crucial significance for the formulation and development of the concept of 
collective human rights, which are defined as ‘third generation’ human rights. This thesis 
appears to be all the more plausible if it is borne in mind that in the later work of the 
General Assembly, and in discussion within this organ, there was a clear tendency to 
connect the right to self-determination with the category of collective human rights. 
Examples of this are provided by the provisions of the Declaration on Social Progress 
and Development, of 11 December 1969,17 and the provisions of the Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States, of 14 December 1974.18
The most representative interpretations of the principle of self-determination – as 
well as representative interpretations of other fundamental principles of international 
law – can be found in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, which was adopted as a resolution of the General Assembly on 24 
October 1970.19 This Declaration, similarly to the Declaration of 1960, explicitly con-
nects the principle of self-determination with human rights, stating that: “subjection of 
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the 
principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Char-
ter.” When defining the essence of the principle of self-determination, the Declaration 
goes on to state that: “By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right 
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect 
this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.” However, when it comes to 
the potential means for implementing this right, the Declaration states that: “The estab-
lishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with 
an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined 
by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that 
people.” It should be borne in mind, however, that the Declaration’s interpretation of 
the United Nations Charter provisions that concern the principle of self-determination 
is only a sui generis authentic interpretation. This is because it was not formulated in an 
international agreement, but rather in a General Assembly resolution. It should also be 
emphasized that this Declaration interprets the right to self-determination in a broader 
16 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples − A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge 1995, p. 159 et seq.
17 UNGA Res. 2542 (XXIV).
18 UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX).
19 UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friend-
ly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.
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context, rather than only in the colonial context, in such a way that it extends the scope 
of entities who are entitled to exercise this right.20
The principle of self-determination was also formulated in normative acts outside of 
the UN system. A good example of this is provided by the Helsinki Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of 1 August 1975. The doctrine of 
international law emphasizes that this Act introduced the principle of self-determina-
tion to Europe, which consists of states of national and ethnic diversity.21 The Helsinki 
Final Act proclaimed the ten principles of international law, placing the principle of 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms alongside the principles of equality 
and national self-determination. In contrast, the right of peoples to self-determination, 
which follows from this principle, was defined as follows: “The participating States will 
respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all 
times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to terri-
torial integrity of States. By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and 
as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, 
and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.”22 
Interpretation of these provisions leads to the conclusion that, in contrast to the major-
ity of regulations adopted under the United Nations system which are concerned with 
the principle of self-determination, the European dimension of this principle referred 
primarily to internal self-determination. These provisions were reflected in international 
practice. For example, UN General Assembly resolution 48/49 acknowledged the right 
of the Palestinians and the people of South Africa to internal self-determination.23 Simi-
larly, Opinion no. 2 of the Badinter Commission invoked the right to self-determination 
in the case of the states formed after the break up of Yugoslavia.24 
Discussion on the nature of the principle of self-determination would not be complete 
without reference to its customary law sources. This is due to the fact that international 
20 W. Czapliński, A. Wyrozumska, Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne. Zagadnienia systemowe, 
Warszawa 2014, p. 182.
21 L. Antonowicz, op. cit., p. 70 et seq.; M. Perkowski, op. cit., p. 38.
22 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE): Final Act of Helsinki, 1 August 1975, chap. VIII, www.osce.
org [access: 22.10.2016].
23 UNGA Res. 48/94, Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples 
for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights.
24 A. Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee. A Second Breadth for Determmi-
nation of Peoples, “European Journal of International Law” 1992, no. 3, p. 178 et seq.; P. Łaski, 
Dezintegracja Zwiazku Radzieckiego i Jugosławii w świetle prawa międzynarodowego, “Annales 
UMCS” 1992, no. 39, p. 57 et seq.
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custom, as a typical source of the rights and obligations, still occupies a prominent place 
in the system of the formal sources of international law. It can therefore be claimed that, 
despite the prevailing role of agreements in various areas of international co-operation, 
discussion on the basic institutions of this law frequently requires reference to inter-
national custom. As was mentioned previously, until the establishment of the United 
Nations, there was no positive convergence of usus and opinio juris on the issue of the 
self-determination of peoples. Consequently, the principle of self-determination took 
on a political character.25 However, there was a fundamental change after the founding 
of the United Nations, which assigned itself a  leading role in shaping customary law 
with regard to self-determination. This is clear from the fact that the General Assembly 
resolutions mentioned above, despite only having the status of ‘soft law’, frequently in-
voke the principle of self-determination26. This situation indicates not only that the UN 
attempted to coordinate the behaviour of states in this regard, but also that this practice 
paved the way for customary law to be introduced to the field of human rights protec-
tion27. As a consequence, many authors are of the opinion that the customary law roots 
of the principle of self-determination – which was eventually incorporated into the UN 
Charter and confirmed in other treaty regulations – is beyond doubt.28 For some authors, 
the General Assembly resolutions that were adopted in accordance with Articles 10, 13 
and 14 of the UN Charter, and which affirm the principle of national self-determina-
tion, thereby established customary law, which can be best seen in the aforementioned 
resolution 2625 (XXV).29 Mention should also be made of the UN Security Council’s 
resolutions on Namibia,30 East Timor31 and Western Sahara.32 It should be remembered, 
however, that this way of shaping the customary norms of international law conferred 
the right to self-determination on colonized peoples, since international practice at this 
time in principle referred exclusively to the process of decolonisation. In this context, 
therefore, the process of decolonisation unambiguously determined the formation of 
customary law norms, entailing the right of colonized peoples to self-determination. 
25 A. Cristescu, The Right to Self-determination. Historical and Current Development on the Basis of 
the United Nations Instruments, New York 1981, p. 23 et seq.
26 Na temat mocy prawnej uchwał organów organizacji międzynarodowych: K. Skubiszewski, 
Czy uchwały Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ są źródłem prawa?, “Państwo i Prawo” 1981, no. 2, 
p. 24 et seq.
27 V., e.g., R. Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations, New York 1963, p. 104 et seq.
28 J. Tyranowski, Integralność terytorialna, nienaruszalność granic i  samostanowienie w  prawie 
międzynarodowym, Warszawa 1990, p. 206; W. Czapliński, Aktualne problemy prawa do samo-
stanowienia, “Toruński Rocznik Praw Człowieka i Pokoju 1994–1995” 1996, vol. 3, p. 87.
29 M. Perkowski, op. cit., p. 34.
30 UN SC Res. 301/1971.
31 UN SC Res. 377/1975.
32 UN SC Res. 1598/2005.
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This right was codified and developed in the texts of both the International Covenants 
on Human Rights. At this point it is worth emphasizing that the customary character of 
international law norms, which affirmed the right of peoples to self-determination, was 
also invoked by the International Court of Justice, whose case-law delineates and con-
tinues to delineate important directions in the development of this right. For example, 
in the advisory opinion on the Namibia case, the Court confirmed the legal merits of the 
General Assembly resolution 1514 of 1960, and incorporated the right of peoples to self-
determination into the system of modern international law.33 In the advisory opinion on 
the Western Sahara case, the court recognized the principle of self-determination to be 
a fundamental principle of international law in the context of the decolonisation process. 
The court also decided in favour of the principle of self-determination if there should 
be conflict with the principle of territorial integrity.34 A broader context for the right to 
self-determination can be found in the Court’s judgment in the Portuguese-Australian 
conflict over the East Timor case, which emphasized that, for both Portugal and Aus-
tralia, East Timor constituted a non-self governing territory, and held that both Parties 
in the dispute should respect the right of the people living in the territory to self-deter-
mination. As has been previously stated, in this judgment the Court also emphasised the 
erga omnes character of the obligations of all states, resulting from the right of peoples 
to self-determination.35 The erga omnes character of such obligations was later confirmed 
by the ICJ in the advisory opinion in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in which the Court recognised the right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination. At the same time, the Court ruled that no 
state could claim any situation to be contrary to this right, or undertake or support any 
action that would violate a nation’s right to self-determination.36 To sum up the Court’s 
position, it must be emphasized that states are obliged to assist peoples to achieve their 
right to self-determination and to refrain from recognizing a state of affairs which would 
in practice constitute a violation of this right.37 It would seem that the Court’s delibera-
tions followed a similar vein in the advisory opinion on whether Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence was compatible with international law. When investigating and assessing 
the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in the context of Security Council 
resolution 1244 (1999), the Court ruled that there is no general prohibition on declara-
33 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
1971, pp. 31–32.
34 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, pp. 31–33, 52–53 and 122.
35 East Timor Case (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, pp. 102 and 29.
36 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, pp. 171–172 and 88.
37 M. Kałduński, op., cit., p. 448.
The Principle of Self-Determination... | 33 
tions of independence in international law, considering the development of international 
law with regard to self-determination.38
Concluding remarks
There is no doubt that the principle of self-determination is a particularly important 
universal norm of international law of a peremptory character, which gives rise to erga 
omnes obligations. The essential element is the right of peoples to self-determination, the 
exercise of which is realized in the right to establish their own state, the right to integrate 
through unification with another state, and the right to free economic, social and cultural 
development.39 From the above analysis of the regulations of modern international law, 
it is evident that there is a clear connection between the principle of self-determination 
and human rights law. Despite the fact that the right to self-determination is classed 
as a collective human right, it is necessary to analyse and assess this right in a much 
broader context. Its implementation is a prerequisite for the proper exercise, promotion 
and development of all individual human rights which have been defined in the norms 
of universal international human rights law. This position has been put forward in the 
discussions of the various organs of the United Nations, which can be seen from both 
numerous General Assembly resolutions40 and the invaluable general commentaries of 
the Human Rights Committee, the treaty body of the International Covenant on Civil 
38 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence In Respect of Ko-
sovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403. (“During the second half of the twentieth 
century, the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right 
to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation [...] A great many new States have come into exist-
ence as a result of the exercise of this right. There were, however, also instances of declarations 
of independence outside this context. The practice of States in these latter cases does not point 
to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration 
of independence in such cases.”) For commentary v., e.g., A. Potyrała, Niepodległość Kosowa 
w świetle opinii doradczej Międzynarodowego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, “Środkowoeuropejskie 
Studia Polityczne” 2010, no. 3, p. 27 et seq. In this regard, v. also the position of the Canadian 
High Court in the case of the secession of Quebec: Canadian Supreme Court, Secession of 
Quebec (1998) 2 SCR 217 § 112.
39 M. Perkowski, op. cit., p. 137.
40 For example: in resolution 637 A (VII) of 16 December 1952 The General Assembly recognized 
that: “the right of peoples and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full enjoy-
ment of all fundamental human rights”, and in resolution 49/148 of 23 December 1994 the 
General Assembly confirmed that: “the universal realization of the right of all peoples, includ-
ing those under colonial, foreign and alien domination, to self-determination is a fundamental 
condition for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights and for the preservation 
and promotion of such rights.”
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and Political Rights.41 The literature also puts forward the position that there is a kind 
of interdependence between the principle of self-determination and human rights law42. 
All this allows the following conclusion to be drawn: that, just as in the past, in the near 
future the evolution of the principle of self-determination in international practice will 
primarily take place in the context of the development of international human rights law. 
Of course, nowadays the opportunities for exercising the right to self-determination in 
practice are significantly more limited than they were in the second half of the twentieth 
century, but the principle of self-determination will remain an essential element in the 
process of implementing the norms of international human right law.
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summary
The Principle of Self-Determination  
in the Context of Human Rights
The essay presents the issue of the principle of self-determination from the perspective 
of international human rights law. The author highlights the close relationship between 
the principle of self-determination and the principle of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. In practice, the principle of self-determination is a prerequisite 
for the effective guarantee of human rights, and, at the same time, guaranteed protection 
of human rights is a prerequisite for implementing the principle of national self-deter-
mination. The author presents the issue of self-determination in the context of the basic 
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regulations of international human rights law, considering regulations of both a ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ law character.
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